The relationship between the ruler and the ruled is a matter of fundamental importance. That is why attitudes to weapons are important. If we have decent government, decent rulers who trust us and vice versa then all is well. They will have the Consent Of The Governed. Corrupt governments, treating the will of the people with contemptuous indifference are corrupt, vicious, dangerous, illegitimate.
If they disarm people they do not trust them or they want to oppress them, rob them, even murder them wholesale. That is what Joe Stalin did. We have the Right Of Revolution regardless of what governments say. That is why the little snippet below is instructive. Englishmen were trusted once. Scots were not.
Interesting research: Douglas W. Allen and Peter T. Leeson, "Institutionally Constrained Technology Adoption: Resolving the Longbow Puzzle," Journal of Law and Economics, v. 58, Aug 2015.
Abstract: For over a century the longbow reigned as undisputed king of medieval European missile weapons. Yet only England used the longbow as a mainstay in its military arsenal; France and Scotland clung to the technologically inferior crossbow. This longbow puzzle has perplexed historians for decades. We resolve it by developing a theory of institutionally constrained technology adoption. Unlike the crossbow, the longbow was cheap and easy to make and required rulers who adopted the weapon to train large numbers of citizens in its use. These features enabled usurping nobles whose rulers adopted the longbow to potentially organize effective rebellions against them. Rulers choosing between missile technologies thus confronted a trade-off with respect to internal and external security. England alone in late medieval Europe was sufficiently politically stable to allow its rulers the first-best technology option. In France and Scotland political instability prevailed, constraining rulers in these nations to the crossbow.
It comes from https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/01/security_trade-_3.html
Interesting research: Douglas W. Allen and Peter T. Leeson, "Institutionally Constrained Technology Adoption: Resolving the Longbow Puzzle," Journal of Law and Economics, v. 58, Aug 2015.
Danish Home Guard ex Wiki
It as created after the last war to protect the people against the USSR and against their very own government.