Is a new party formed because the
Party has gone wrong. It has not had much publicity yet. This because the
main stream parties and the Main Stream Media have not told us about it. They
have their agendas. The truth comes nowhere. Now we have
British Freedom's 20 Point Plan.
It has virtues.
New Nationalist Demographics
Demographics are destiny. Islamics are pouring into England. They are breeding much faster - paid for by the dole, by English tax payers. We are being crowded out of our own land.
Why the British Freedom Party was Founded
In Britain, the chasm between mainstream political opinion on the one side, and public opinion on the other, now gapes so wide that not even the staunchest party supporters can any longer skirt around it. Tim Montgomerie, editor of the ConservativeHome website, best summed up the situation in a BBC radio interview a while back:
I think there are a huge number of issues now where the main political parties in Parliament all think the same – Europe, the war in Afghanistan, prisons, climate change – there’s a whole range of issues where the public may have different views from the MPs but no mainstream party represents them.
The roots of the liberal consensus in Parliament and public estrangement from politics may be deep and tangled, but perhaps part of the problem is the remoteness of today’s professional politicians from normal life. Addressing the specific issue of immigration, newspaper columnist Peter Hitchens – old-fashioned Tory and fierce critic of the party’s leftward lurch under David Cameron – recently commented:
… the modernised Tory Party, just like its New Labour twin, actively favours large-scale migration. Rich young careerists in pleasant parts of London – who form the core of all our establishment parties – couldn’t function without the cheap servants and cheap restaurants that immigration brings.
Not for them the other side of immigration – the transformation of familiar neighbourhoods into foreign territory. Not for them the schools where many pupils cannot speak English, and the overloaded public services. Not for them the mosque and the madrassa where the church and the pub used to be.
A report published 28 February 2011 by the Searchlight Education Trust confirms the existence of a substantial – hitherto all but invisible – section of the British electorate comprising people who are worried about the nation’s continuing transformation, but find themselves politically disenfranchised, stranded between the mainstream parties and those at the nationalist fringe. Fear & Hope describes a survey carried out by polling organisation Populus, who asked 5,054 people 91 questions on faith, ethnicity and national identity. Billed as “the most systematic study of contemporary attitudes to race, identity, nationhood and extremism available in England”, it found that:
• the English are sceptical of multiculturalism and deeply resentful of mass immigration
• they fear extremist Islam
• Black and Asian groups share these concerns
• negativity about immigration is linked to economic pessimism
• the British National Party (BNP) “is in decline” and there is “a limit to the potential growth” of the English Defence League (EDL)
• most people are traditional rather than “progressive”
• the vast majority reject political violence
• there is “popular support for a non-violent and non-racist” nationalist political party.
The report speaks of “an assertive nationalism”, of “a new politics built around… identity, culture and nationhood which transcends both an older class politics and even more recent debates around demographics and immigration”.
The British Freedom Party
Like its European counterparts, British Freedom espouses cultural nationalism, as opposed to ethnic nationalism. We believe that national identity derives primarily from the integration of individuals and communities into an established culture, their acceptance of and allegiance to the rich set of customs, values, political procedures, laws and understandings handed down by tradition.
We know that cultural and social integration is achievable, because so many have already achieved it. Integrated immigrant communities provide the strongest evidence of the essentially cultural character of Britishness. Because for every Muslim bomb-maker or honour killer living in Britain, countless numbers of his co-religionists are working hard, learning our language and history, paying taxes, obeying the law, raising families and doing their best to fit in.
Similarly, for every chippy East London ‘gangsta’ who likes to mug white people for a living, there are countless others from the same part of town and from the same racial background who work, study, fix up their cars, take their girlfriends to the movies and play Sunday morning soccer on Hackney Marshes.
The difference between the law-breakers and the law-keepers, the hostile and the integrated, is primarily cultural. Culture and race are connected, but they are evidently separable.
A common characteristic among successful integrators is that, through immersion in our culture, they come to acquire a strongly British self-identity, a type of patriotism that is comparable, though not identical, to that of indigenous Britons – more so when family roots in this country are generations deep.
We in the Freedom Party believe that the resolution of present problems lies not in some dream of restoring Britain’s postwar racial balance (however desirable that may seem, it is impossible), but in distinguishing between destructive and constructive people and forces in society, dealing robustly with the former and strongly incentivising the latter.
Unlike liberals, we do not deny ethnicity as an important component of self-identity, national identity and historical continuity. Neither do we deny that bringing so many races together in a small island has created terrible difficulties, or that native Britons seethe with anger at the unwanted changes wrought on their communities by mass immigration. And that is why one of British Freedom’s main migration policy demands is an immediate halt to further immigration.
We define ourselves in terms of a traditional pro-Britain attitude, an attitude that informs all of our policies: economic policies that emphasise the revitalisation of industries in which Britain has traditionally excelled; agricultural, energy, environmental and defence policies geared towards national self-sufficiency and independence; crime and justice policies that seek to restore traditional practices of policing, deterrence and punishment; health policies that prioritise treatment for British citizens; and education policies that emphasise traditional competencies as well as academic freedom and rigour.
Cultural nationalism versus ethnic nationalism
Ironically, the British Freedom Party owes its existence to the anti-nationalist establishment. Under the UK’s Equality Act, which forced racial and ethno-nationalist parties to amend offending clauses in their constitution related to membership criteria and objectives, Culture is not one of the 7 grounds listed under the Act that are unlawful when used as direct or indirect discrimination. Therefore, by ramming this vexatious act through the British Parliament, the establishment opened the door to a nationalism that is potentially far more dynamic and certainly more populist than its race-centric or ethno-centric counterparts.
British ethno-nationalism is underpinned, rationalised and justified by the ‘indigenous argument’. The BNP’s one major victory was to force establishment figures, mainstream politicians and journalists to define sections of the British populace as the ‘indigenous population’, thereby recognising and legitimising core ethno-nationalist arguments, in the face of ignorant claims that the UK is a ‘mongrel nation’ – which is in itself an attempt to psychologically divorce the indigenous population from its ancestral homelands.
However, we find that most of the support for parties such as the BNP is policy-orientated, and not ideological, demonstrating that the support isn’t ‘getting their message’ and can quite easily switch over to parties that offer the same populist policies – EU withdrawal, an end to mass immigration – without any ideological hurdles.
Nick Griffin’s BNP was quick to dismiss the English Defence League as a tool of the state. This proclamation should be taken with a large pinch of salt. The BNP, prior to the emergence of the EDL, held the monopoly in the anti-Islamisation quarter. It’s no secret that Nick Griffin looked upon the rise of the EDL with jealousy, and even going as far as to suggest that the BNP resurrect the street activities that the party abandoned in the late 90s, in an effort to halt the haemorrhaging of support.
Poll results tell us that the core policies of the BNP are very popular, but when these policies are attached to the BNP name, the support falls significantly, because of the historical baggage carried by a party that has tried to change its spots over the last decade, but has failed to dispose its most high profile purveyor, Nick Griffin. Therefore, the BNP under its current leader has its national vote share ceilinged at 5%, not enough to win a single seat in the parliament which holds the key to withdrawal from the European Union.
The decline of the British National Party and the rise of the English Defence League are probably related. But for all the EDL’s noise and visibility, and its skill in mobilising sectors of the disaffected working class, it looks an unlikely candidate to rescue Britain from the triple scourge of mass immigration, multiculturalism and globalisation.
For one thing, the League is not a political party; for another, it isn’t much concerned with issues other than “militant Islam”; and for a third, it doesn’t appeal to most people, largely because of its suspected links to soccer hooliganism. Mr and Mrs Middle England – if we may so designate traditional, patriotic voters – would no more think of participating in an “E-E-EDL” chant at some raucous street rally than of inviting Nick Griffin and his twin rottweilers to Sunday lunch.
Britain has a proud record of defending freedom through many of the darkest periods of European history. But the systematic undermining of national self-confidence by the ruling elite has eroded our capacity to oppose the nation’s dismantling.
For us to retain our distinctive identity, which has both cultural and ethnic components, requires decisive action to stop the tide of immigration, to reverse the handover of powers to the European Union and other undemocratic, supranational interests, and to restore British values, traditions and freedoms to the centre of public life.
To achieve this requires political power, which in turn requires broad popular support. That is why the British Freedom Party welcomes patriots of all backgrounds. Our inclusiveness, in terms of class, race and age, distinguishes us from other comparable parties, for example UKIP (the UK Independence Party), which is fundamentally a single-issue party appealing to older, middle class people.
We provide common ground for all those who feel betrayed by establishment parties, for “people who strongly resent the direction their country has taken” (to borrow Colin Liddell’s phrase), including traditional Conservatives, disaffected heartland Labour voters, pragmatists from other nationalist groupings, and patriotic minorities.
British Freedom is a moderate party founded on principles of cultural nationalism. We present populist policies within a nationalist ideological framework, but without focussing on ethno-centric objectives and policies, because it’s our belief that indigenous ethnic interests are best presented by a non-partisan ‘civil rights’ organisation.
About the authors
George Whale is a research administrator and former software engineer and print specialist. He has a Ph.D. in creative cognition from Loughborough University, UK, and currently lives and works in Glasgow, Scotland.
Michael Wood is a nationalist of 10 years’ standing, and a member of the Executive Council of the British Freedom Party. He has degrees in Marine Biology, Geology and Physical Geography from Cardiff University and works as a Spokesman.
This is better than the BNP but how much better? Given that they seem to be taking Searchlight, an organization run by criminals and Subversives at face value it is questionable. The idea that foreigners can integrate is dubious at best. Nigeria is just one example of its failure.
Fear And Hope Report
The anti-fascist organisation Searchlight [ run by career criminals - Editor ] has found itself on the front-line of a new politics of identity. What began as a fight against Fascism has broadened as British extremism has changed form over the past decade. It is now impossible to simply deal with the Far Right threat, as Searchlight has done for almost 50 years, without also addressing other forms of extremism acting as drivers and recruiters for the Right. That is why Searchlight commissioned the polling specialist, Populus, to survey attitudes in modern Britain. We hoped to gain a richer understanding of the nature of hope and fear.
There have been dozens of polls and analyses that have tracked changing attitudes towards immigration and race. However, Searchlight’s experience of this shifting dynamic – of a politics of culture, identity, and nation suggested that much deeper forces were driving attitudes towards ‘Others’. These forces did not seem to be adequately described by our traditional notions of social class.
The clearest manifestation of these deeper forces has been the rise of the British National Party (BNP), UK Independence Party (UKIP) and more recently the English Defence League (EDL). While some confidently wrote off the Far Right threat after the BNP’s poor results in last year’s general and local elections, Searchlight believed the threat remained, albeit in a new form. We felt that these far-right parties were simply symptoms of a deeper growth of identity politics, mixed with economic and (perceived and real) social change, which (left unaddressed) would eventually manifest politically. Nature abhors a vacuum; fringe groups seed in fertile ground.
This report and the survey which underpins it is Searchlight’s attempt to create a richer framework through which we can understand the dynamics of hope and fear in modern British society. It also highlights the risks that we face by not comprehending and not responding to strong forces which can divide communities both locally and nationally.
While the traditional class-based, left-right, social democratic/neo-liberal models of British politics still have some relevance, our central argument is that these need to be understood alongside a new politics of identity.
Much of the recent political discourse has been concerned with politicians accepting the rising importance of immigration as a political issue, and the sense that we increasingly lack ‘cohesion’ or ‘integration.’ But political elites are already behind the curve. Political parties have struggled and failed to catch up with the development of a broader and more fundamental politics of identity.
This new politics of identity means:
The politics of immigration, a politically active issue in the decade past, has morphed into a politics of culture, identity and nation. This represents a significant shift.
The BNP is tied to the old politics of race and immigration. They have failed to adapt, which means they are sinking under the weight of their own negative image. The signs so far are that they are not capable of adapting to a broader politics of culture, identity and nation and therefore unable to reach out beyond the extremist fringes of society.
Identity politics will shape-shift and consume extremist, fascist and racially-motivated political forces. These malign forces will not disappear and could merely find new, and on the surface, more respectable homes. The EDL and UKIP are already adapting to the new post-immigration, post-BNP environment and others may follow them.
The possibility of the rise of a respectable, anti-violence, anti-immigration, anti-EU, non-fascist, anti-Islamic extremist party of flag and tradition is possible. This is contingent on the perceived competence of the major parties, economic conditions, and credible leadership.
Given this context, and with the coming fiscal austerity, Searchlight Educational Trust commissioned this report and research to broaden discussion and understanding of the current political context. The basic hypothesis that lies behind the research is:
"There is a new political spectrum and dynamic that explains attitudes to culture, identity and nation."
The Fear and HOPE research has identified six ‘identity-defined’ groups in society. At one extreme of this spectrum lie liberals and multiculturalists. At the other end lie both active as well as latently-hostile groups.
These tribes can be defined as follows:
Confident Multiculturalists (eight per cent of the population)
Mainstream Liberals (16%)
Identity Ambivalents (28%)
Cultural Integrationists (24%)
Latent Hostiles (10%)
Active Enmity (13%)
We can see that, broadly speaking, the new politics of identity splits as follows:
These divides constitute a new political understanding through which personal, community, economic, ethic, national identity, and global issues and attitudes can be understood. A person’s location on this spectrum is no longer accurately described by their socio-economic class alone. For example, voters of the DE social group split 5%-14%-30%-19%-10%-21% [see table: Segment breakdown by class].
By applying the attitudes of these ‘tribes’ to a series of questions focusing on standard of living, race, immigration, nation, identity, community, values, and religion, a number of themes emerge. The following are particularly noteworthy:
Optimism v pessimism; security v insecurity.
Economic change and identity.
Englishness, Britishness and identity.
Changing minority attitudes.
Social capital v social dislocation.
Working class fragmentation and dislocation.
Negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims.
The refraction of individual issues through the prism of identity politics.
A potential political vacuum on the right.
This analysis is a challenge to central and local Government, political parties, the media, campaign groups and community organisations. A different political dynamic calls for a different approach to policy, communication, organisation, and prioritisation. This report concludes with a series of practical recommendations for a response to the new politics of culture, identity and nation.
The core message, however, is that this changing political dynamic cannot be ignored. As happened with the controversy over immigration, this new dynamic is real and it is not going away. The question is rather: which response will gain the most traction. If it is to be the political mainstream and not the political extremes then a swift set of responses is required. The choice is between a politics of unity or a politics of division. It is between hope and hate.
Searching for new ways to explain political behaviour change
Drivers of political behaviour are the subject of intense academic debate. It is clear that social class has lost much of its importance in determining voting behaviour. This is not the same thing as saying class is irrelevant. The alternative view which states ‘valence’ issues as the major explanation of voting has its own limitations. ‘Valence’ includes image and party reputation. It is a retail form of politics but in itself is unsatisfactory.
For the purposes of understanding what forms attitudes several assumptions have been made.
Firstly, class is weakening as an explanatory factor for peoples’ values, attitudes and voting behaviour. Secondly, while ‘valence’ factors are significant in terms of voting, they have less of an impact when it comes to cultural dispositions and social attitudes. Therefore, attitudes in relation to culture, identity and nation are formed on the basis of a complex interplay of:
The central contention is that a politics of identity – where people congregate around the clusters or segments outlined above – has risen alongside a traditional left-right, class-based political axis.
Without understanding these clusters of attitudes towards issues of identity, an understanding of British politics is not possible. As class weakens as a means of understanding social attitudes and political change, and the old left-right dynamic of British politics weakens with it, there is a search for dynamics driving political change. The ‘tribes’ outlined here are intended as a contribution to that discussion.
1. Castells, M. The Power of Identity. 1997, p.2.
British Freedom's 20 Point Plan
British Freedom’s 20 Point Plan
1. Introduce a US style First Amendment guaranteeing Free Speech.
2. Leave the profoundly undemocratic European Union.
3. Abolish the Human Rights Act, which benefits only foreign criminals/ terrorists.
4. Halt any further immigration for a period of five years.
5. Deport foreign criminals, seditious dual nationality Islamists and illegal immigrants.
6. Abolish all multicultural and equality quangos.
7. Halt and turn back all aspects of the Islamisation of Britain, including Sharia finance.
8. Drastically reduce crime – criminals should fear the consequences of their behaviour.
9. Repair the damage wreaked by the progressive educational establishment.
10. Promote British values and assimilation, rather than multiculturalism and division.
11. Rebuild Britain’s Armed Forces to 1980 levels.
12. Diminish the public sector and government interference in the private sector.
13. Withdraw troops from all areas where we are not directly threatened.
14. Cancel foreign aid to countries which do not deserve or need it.
15. End welfare payments to immigrants; they must pay for their housing and children.
16. Ensure no elderly person lives in fear, and can afford both heat and food in the winter.
17. Abolish destructive Political Correctness, promote Common Sense.
18. Promote morality, marriage, the family, the community and the nation state.
19. Allow pubs the freedom of operating as smoking or non-smoking establishments.
20. Live by Christianity’s Golden Rule: "Do unto others as thou wouldst be done by”.