CRYPTO-GRAM

Comes from Bruce Schneier, a very well known cryptographer.
BT Security Futurologist
schneier@schneier.com
http://www.schneier.com
If you want his monthly analyses ask, that's all it takes.; just visit <http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html>. He tells us about the NSA, CIA, Edward Snowden's work and much more.



https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/archives/2017/0415.html
Windows 10 Is A Spy Tool
Fourth WikiLeaks CIA Attack Tool Dump

WikiLeaks is obviously playing their top secret CIA data cache for as much press as they can, leaking the documents a little at a time. On Friday they published their fourth set of documents from what they call "Vault 7":

27 documents from the CIA's Grasshopper framework, a platform used to build customized malware payloads for Microsoft Windows operating systems.

We have absolutely no idea who leaked this one. When they first started appearing, I suspected that it was not an insider because there wasn't anything illegal in the documents. There still isn't, but let me explain further. The CIA documents are all hacking tools. There's nothing about programs or targets. Think about the Snowden leaks: it was the information about programs that targeted Americans, programs that swept up much of the world's information, programs that demonstrated particularly powerful NSA capabilities. There's nothing like that in the CIA leaks. They're just hacking tools. All they demonstrate is that the CIA hoards vulnerabilities contrary to the government's stated position, but we already knew that.

 

 

The Public/Private Surveillance Partnership
Imagine the government passed a law requiring all citizens to carry a tracking device. Such a law would immediately be found unconstitutional. Yet we all carry mobile phones.

If the National Security Agency required us to notify it whenever we made a new friend, the nation would rebel. Yet we notify Facebook. If the Federal Bureau of Investigation demanded copies of all our conversations and correspondence, it would be laughed at. Yet we provide copies of our e-mail to Google, Microsoft or whoever our mail host is; we provide copies of our text messages to Verizon, AT&T and Sprint; and we provide copies of other conversations to Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, or whatever other site is hosting them.

The primary business model of the Internet is built on mass surveillance, and our government's intelligence-gathering agencies have become addicted to that data. Understanding how we got here is critical to understanding how we undo the damage.

Computers and networks inherently produce data, and our constant interactions with them allow corporations to collect an enormous amount of intensely personal data about us as we go about our daily lives. Sometimes we produce this data inadvertently simply by using our phones, credit cards, computers and other devices. Sometimes we give corporations this data directly on Google, Facebook, Apple Inc.'s iCloud and so on in exchange for whatever free or cheap service we receive from the Internet in return.

The NSA is also in the business of spying on everyone, and it has realized it's far easier to collect all the data from these corporations rather than from us directly. In some cases, the NSA asks for this data nicely. In other cases, it makes use of subtle threats or overt pressure. If that doesn't work, it uses tools like national security letters.

The result is a corporate-government surveillance partnership, one that allows both the government and corporations to get away with things they couldn't otherwise.

There are two types of laws in the U.S., each designed to constrain a different type of power: constitutional law, which places limitations on government, and regulatory law, which constrains corporations. Historically, these two areas have largely remained separate, but today each group has learned how to use the other's laws to bypass their own restrictions. The government uses corporations to get around its limits, and corporations use the government to get around their limits.

This partnership manifests itself in various ways. The government uses corporations to circumvent its prohibitions against eavesdropping domestically on its citizens. Corporations rely on the government to ensure that they have unfettered use of the data they collect.

Here's an example: It would be reasonable for our government to debate the circumstances under which corporations can collect and use our data, and to provide for protections against misuse. But if the government is using that very data for its own surveillance purposes, it has an incentive to oppose any laws to limit data collection. And because corporations see no need to give consumers any choice in this matter -- because it would only reduce their profits -- the market isn't going to protect consumers, either.

Our elected officials are often supported, endorsed and funded by these corporations as well, setting up an incestuous relationship between corporations, lawmakers and the intelligence community.

The losers are us, the people, who are left with no one to stand up for our interests. Our elected government, which is supposed to be responsible to us, is not. And corporations, which in a market economy are supposed to be responsive to our needs, are not. What we have now is death to privacy -- and that's very dangerous to democracy and liberty.

The simple answer is to blame consumers, who shouldn't use mobile phones, credit cards, banks or the Internet if they don't want to be tracked. But that argument deliberately ignores the reality of today's world. Everything we do involves computers, even if we're not using them directly. And by their nature, computers produce tracking data. We can't go back to a world where we don't use computers, the Internet or social networking. We have no choice but to share our personal information with these corporations, because that's how our world works today.

Curbing the power of the corporate-private surveillance partnership requires limitations on both what corporations can do with the data we choose to give them and restrictions on how and when the government can demand access to that data. Because both of these changes go against the interests of corporations and the government, we have to demand them as citizens and voters. We can lobby our government to operate more transparently -- disclosing the opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court would be a good start -- and hold our lawmakers accountable when it doesn't. But it's not going to be easy. There are strong interests doing their best to ensure that the steady stream of data keeps flowing.

This essay originally appeared on Bloomberg.com.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-31/the-public-private-surveillance-partnership.html or http://tinyurl.com/me4bpsx

 

The NSA is Commandeering the Internet
It turns out that the NSA's domestic and world-wide surveillance apparatus is even more extensive than we thought.  Bluntly: The government has commandeered the Internet. Most of the largest Internet companies provide information to the NSA, betraying their users.  Some, as we've learned, fight and lose. Others cooperate, either out of patriotism or because they believe it's easier that way.

I have one message to the executives of those companies: fight.

Do you remember those old spy movies, when the higher ups in government decide that the mission is more important than the spy's life?  It's going to be the same way with you.  You might think that your friendly relationship with the government means that they're going to protect you, but they won't.  The NSA doesn't care about you or your customers, and will burn you the moment it's convenient to do so.

We're already starting to see that. Google, Yahoo, Microsoft and others are pleading with the government to allow them to explain details of what information they provided in response to National Security Letters and other government demands.  They've lost the trust of their customers, and explaining what they do -- and don't do -- is how to get it back.  The government has refused; they don't care.

It will be the same with you.  There are lots more high-tech companies who have cooperated with the government.  Most of those company names are somewhere in the thousands of documents that Edward Snowden took with him, and sooner or later they'll be released to the public.  The NSA probably told you that your cooperation would forever remain secret, but they're sloppy.  They'll put your company name on presentations delivered to thousands of people: government employees, contractors, probably even foreign nationals.  If Snowden doesn't have a copy, the next whistleblower will.

This is why you have to fight.  When it becomes public that the NSA has been hoovering up all of your users' communications and personal files, what's going to save you in the eyes of those users is whether or not you fought.  Fighting will cost you money in the short term, but capitulating will cost you more in the long term.

Already companies are taking their data and communications out of the US.

The extreme case of fighting is shutting down entirely.  The secure e-mail service Lavabit did that last week, abruptly.  Ladar Levison, that site's owner, wrote on his homepage:  "I have been forced to make a difficult decision: to become complicit in crimes against the American people or walk away from nearly ten years of hard work by shutting down Lavabit. After significant soul searching, I have decided to suspend operations. I wish that I could legally share with you the events that led to my decision." [ In order to spy on Edward Snowden it turns out but they are back on line and trustworthy. There is a very good account at How Lavabit Melted Down - Editor ]

The same day, Silent Circle followed suit, shutting down their e-mail service in advance of any government strong-arm tactics:  "We see the writing the wall, and we have decided that it is best for us to shut down Silent Mail now. We have not received subpoenas, warrants, security letters, or anything else by any government, and this is why we are acting now."  I realize that this is extreme.  Both of those companies can do it because they're small.  Google or Facebook couldn't possibly shut themselves off rather than cooperate with the government.  They're too large; they're public.  They have to do what's economically rational, not what's moral.

But they can fight.  You, an executive in one of those companies, can fight.  You'll probably lose, but you need to take the stand.  And you might win. It's time we called the government's actions what they really are: commandeering.  Commandeering is a practice we're used to in wartime, where commercial ships are taken for military use, or production lines are converted to military production.  But now it's happening in peacetime.  Vast swaths of the Internet are being commandeered to support this surveillance state.

If this is happening to your company, do what you can to isolate the actions.  Do you have employees with security clearances who can't tell you what they're doing?  Cut off all automatic lines of communication with them, and make sure that only specific, required, authorized acts are being taken on behalf of government. Only then can you look your customers and the public in the face and say that you don't know what is going on -- that your company has been commandeered.

Journalism professor Jeff Jarvis recently wrote in the "Guardian": "Technology companies: now is the moment when you must answer for us, your users, whether you are collaborators in the US government's efforts to 'collect it all' -- our every move on the internet -- or whether you, too, are victims of its overreach."

So while I'm sure it's cool to have a secret White House meeting with President Obama -- I'm talking to you, Google, Apple, AT&T, and whoever else was in the room -- resist.  Attend the meeting, but fight the secrecy.  Whose side are you on?

The NSA isn't going to remain above the law forever.  Already public opinion is changing, against the government and their corporate collaborators.  If you want to keep your users' trust, demonstrate that you were on their side.

This essay originally appeared on TheAtlantic.com.
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/08/the-nsa-is-commandeering-the-internet/278572/ or http://tinyurl.com/koa9bzc

Corporations and the NSA surveillance apparatus:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/08/the_publicpriva_1.html
http://www.schneier.com/essay-436.html
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2013/06/how-yahoo-fought-prism-and-lost/66233/ or http://tinyurl.com/ldxkpkt
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/04/google-fights-nsl/
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57593538-38/how-the-u.s-forces-net-firms-to-cooperate-on-surveillance/ or http://tinyurl.com/jw7f4ob
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/elements/2013/06/what-its-like-to-get-a-national-security-letter.html or http://tinyurl.com/ntd3ffe

 

 

Restoring Trust in Government and the Internet
In July 2012, responding to allegations that the video-chat service Skype -- owned by Microsoft -- was changing its protocols to make it possible for the government to eavesdrop on users, Corporate Vice President Mark Gillett took to the company's blog to deny it.

Turns out that wasn't quite true.

Or at least he -- or the company's lawyers -- carefully crafted a statement that could be defended as true while completely deceiving the reader. You see, Skype wasn't changing its protocols to make it possible for the government to eavesdrop on users, because the government was already able to eavesdrop on users.

At a Senate hearing in March, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper assured the committee that his agency didn't collect data on hundreds of millions of Americans. He was lying, too. He later defended his lie by inventing a new definition of the word "collect," an excuse that didn't even pass the laugh test.

As Edward Snowden's documents reveal more about the NSA's activities, it's becoming clear that we can't trust anything any one official says about these programs.

Google and Facebook insist that the NSA has no "direct access" to their servers. Of course not; the smart way for the NSA to get all the data is through sniffers.

Apple says it's never heard of PRISM. Of course not; that's the internal name of the NSA database. Companies are publishing reports purporting to show how few requests for customer-data access they've received, a meaningless number when a single Verizon request can cover all of their customers. The Guardian reported that Microsoft secretly worked with the NSA to subvert the security of Outlook, something it carefully denies. Even President Obama's justifications and denials are phrased with the intent that the listener will take his words very literally and not wonder what they really mean.

NSA Director Gen. Keith Alexander has claimed that the NSA's massive surveillance and data mining programs have helped stop more than 50 terrorist plots, 10 inside the U.S. Do you believe him? I think it depends on your definition of "helped." We're not told whether these programs were instrumental in foiling the plots or whether they just happened to be of minor help because the data was there. It also depends on your definition of "terrorist plots." An examination of plots that that FBI claims to have foiled since 9/11 reveals that would-be terrorists have commonly been delusional, and most have been egged on by FBI undercover agents or informants.

Left alone, few were likely to have accomplished much of anything.

Both government agencies and corporations have cloaked themselves in so much secrecy that it's impossible to verify anything they say; revelation after revelation demonstrates that they've been lying to us regularly and tell the truth only when there's no alternative.

There's much more to come. Right now, the press has published only a tiny percentage of the documents Snowden took with him. And Snowden's files are only a tiny percentage of the number of secrets our government is keeping, awaiting the next whistle-blower.

Ronald Reagan once said "trust but verify." That works only if we can verify. In a world where everyone lies to us all the time, we have no choice but to trust blindly, and we have no reason to believe that anyone is worthy of blind trust. It's no wonder that most people are ignoring the story; it's just too much cognitive dissonance to try to cope with it.

This sort of thing can destroy our country. Trust is essential in our society. And if we can't trust either our government or the corporations that have intimate access into so much of our lives, society suffers. Study after study demonstrates the value of living in a high-trust society and the costs of living in a low-trust one.

Rebuilding trust is not easy, as anyone who has betrayed or been betrayed by a friend or lover knows, but the path involves transparency, oversight and accountability. Transparency first involves coming clean. Not a little bit at a time, not only when you have to, but complete disclosure about everything. Then it involves continuing disclosure. No more secret rulings by secret courts about secret laws. No more secret programs whose costs and benefits remain hidden.

Oversight involves meaningful constraints on the NSA, the FBI and others. This will be a combination of things: a court system that acts as a third-party advocate for the rule of law rather than a rubber-stamp organization, a legislature that understands what these organizations are doing and regularly debates requests for increased power, and vibrant public-sector watchdog groups that analyze and debate the government's actions.

Accountability means that those who break the law, lie to Congress or deceive the American people are held accountable. The NSA has gone rogue, and while it's probably not possible to prosecute people for what they did under the enormous veil of secrecy it currently enjoys, we need to make it clear that this behavior will not be tolerated in the future. Accountability also means voting, which means voters need to know what our leaders are doing in our name.

This is the only way we can restore trust. A market economy doesn't work unless consumers can make intelligent buying decisions based on accurate product information. That's why we have agencies like the FDA, truth-in-packaging laws and prohibitions against false advertising.

In the same way, democracy can't work unless voters know what the government is doing in their name. That's why we have open-government laws. Secret courts making secret rulings on secret laws, and companies flagrantly lying to consumers about the insecurity of their products and services, undermine the very foundations of our society.

Since the Snowden documents became public, I have been receiving e-mails from people seeking advice on whom to trust. As a security and privacy expert, I'm expected to know which companies protect their users' privacy and which encryption programs the NSA can't break. The truth is, I have no idea. No one outside the classified government world does. I tell people that they have no choice but to decide whom they trust and to then trust them as a matter of faith. It's a lousy answer, but until our government starts down the path of regaining our trust, it's the only thing we can do.

This essay originally appeared on CNN.com.
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/31/opinion/schneier-nsa-trust/index.html

Skype story:
http://blogs.skype.com/2012/07/26/what-does-skypes-architecture-do
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-19012415
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/technology/silicon-valley-and-spy-agency-bound-by-strengthening-web.html or http://tinyurl.com/q833uj7
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/07/12/skype_surveillance_a_timeline_of_public_claims_and_private_government_dealings.html or http://tinyurl.com/kmjfj27

Clapper story:
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/06/wyden-clapper-nsa-video-congress-spying.html or http://tinyurl.com/lvs5z9g
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/06/director-national-intelligences-word-games-explained-how-government-deceived or http://tinyurl.com/mhtg7rz