A guide to the Supreme Court
justices
Ordinarily, the Supreme Court sits in panels of no more than
nine. All 11 justices will hear the government’s appeal, to
avoid any suggestion that the composition of the panel might
make a difference to the outcome. Caution is understandable:
judges differ in philosophy, temperament and in how they
understand their role.
Lord Neuberger has been the court’s president since 2012. He has denied that the UK has a (proper) constitution and asserted that joining the European Convention on Human Rights has been a journey from ‘the dark ages’ to ‘the age of enlightenment’. In Nicklinson, two years ago, he was willing to extend human rights law to try to force change in the law of assisted suicide. In the end he held back, preferring to try to nudge Parliament. But his reasoning suggests a willingness to stretch the law if it can be rationalised that Parliament still has the last word. This is confirmed by his misinterpretation of the Freedom of Information Act in Evans (on the Prince of Wales’s letters) last year. Lord Neuberger flouted Parliament’s authority in order to limit an executive power he thought unprincipled.
'Lady' Hale is the court’s deputy president. Appointed in 2004, she has long been an outspoken judge, publicly enthusiastic about the Human Rights Act and sceptical about parliamentary sovereignty. She has read statutes in ways that clearly depart from Parliament’s intent and in Nicklinson went further than Lord Neuberger in denouncing the Suicide Act.
Lord Kerr is former Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland. Termed a ‘human rights hero’ by some, Lord Kerr is another enthusiast for greater judicial power. He agreed with Lord Neuberger in Evans and in Nicklinson; only he and Lady Hale were willing to denounce the Suicide Act. In another case, he has asserted, astonishingly, that human rights treaties have effect in English law even without legislation.
If Lord Kerr and Lady Hale are the most reliably radical justices, many of the others are harder to peg. Lord Clarke, appointed to the Court in 2009, has not displayed such a disposition and outlined the case for restraint in Nicklinson.
Lord Wilson joined the court in 2011. In Nicklinson, he echoed Lord Neuberger. However, he did not support the extension of the law of negligence to apply to military action overseas and his dissent in Evans eviscerates the majority decision.
Lord Reed is one of the two Scottish justices. He served for a time as an ad hoc judge of the European Court of Human Rights and often articulated concerns about the limits of judicial capacity. He was on the panel that rejected Lord Kerr’s assertion about human rights treaties but joined Lord Neuberger’s judgment in the Evans case.
Lord Carnwath is a former chairman of the Law Commission and joined the court in 2012. He too dissented from the extension of negligence liability to the military and with Lords Reed and Hughes overruled Lord Kerr’s unorthodox view on human rights treaties.
Lord Hughes joined the court in early 2013. He made the case for judicial restraint in Nicklinson and in Evans. Lord Hodge, the other Scottish justice, joined in late 2013. He has recited the occasional judicial scepticism about parliamentary sovereignty.
Lord Sumption was appointed directly from the bar to the Supreme Court in 2012. He has criticised the expansion and misuse of judicial power by domestic and European courts. In Nicklinson, he was the intellectual leader of the case for judicial restraint.
Perhaps most interesting of all is Lord Mance, who became a law lord in 2005. He has considerable experience with EU law and has led the court in attempting to deter overreach on the part of EU courts and institutions. He has argued against ‘the judicialisation of war’. Lord Mance should see that the High Court misconstrued the way in which the European Communities Act 1972 incorporates EU law. He was in the middle ground in Evans and Nicklinson: wrong, in my view, but more careful than some. In 2008, he sought to limit the scope of the royal prerogative to legislate in crown colonies.
If the government’s appeal is well argued, it should be clear to the court that long-standing constitutional law requires the High Court judgment be overturned. The temptation for the justices will be to abandon the law under the guise of continuity with constitutional history. This whole litigation has been an exercise in tempting the courts. There are reasons to hope that a majority will resist temptation.
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom ex Wiki
The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom is the
supreme court in all matters under
English and Welsh law,
Northern Ireland law and
Scottish
civil law. It is the court of last resort and the highest
appellate court in the
United Kingdom, although the
High Court of Justiciary remains the court of last resort for
criminal law in
Scotland.
The Supreme Court also has jurisdiction to resolve disputes relating to
devolution in the United Kingdom and concerning the legal powers of the
three devolved governments (in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) or laws
made by the devolved legislatures.
The Supreme Court was established by Part 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and started work on 1 October 2009.[1][2] It assumed the judicial functions of the House of Lords, which had been exercised by the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary (commonly called "Law Lords"), the 12 judges appointed as members of the House of Lords to carry out its judicial business. Its jurisdiction over devolution matters had previously been exercised by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
Because of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, the Supreme Court is much more limited in its powers of judicial review than the constitutional or supreme courts of some other countries. It cannot overturn any primary legislation made by Parliament.[3] However, it can overturn secondary legislation if, for example, that legislation is found to be ultra vires to the powers in primary legislation allowing it to be made. Further, under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998, the Supreme Court, like some other courts in the United Kingdom, may make a declaration of incompatibility, indicating that it believes that the legislation subject to the declaration is incompatible with one of the rights in the European Convention on Human Rights.[4] Such a declaration can apply to primary or secondary legislation. The legislation is not overturned by the declaration, and neither Parliament nor the government is required to agree with any such declaration. However, if they do accept a declaration, ministers can exercise powers under section 10 of the act to amend the legislation by statutory instrument to remove the incompatibility, or ask Parliament to amend the legislation.[5]
The current President of the Supreme Court is Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, and its Deputy President is Baroness Hale of Richmond.
Some Senior Judges Are Usurping The Role Of Elected Politicians
By
Richard Ekins
Professor Richard Ekins is a Fellow of St John’s College and an Associate Professor in the University of Oxford. He leads Policy Exchange’s Judicial Power Project.
The case of Evans v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21, concerned the Attorney General’s exercise of the so-called ministerial veto – the power under section 53 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) – to block release of the Prince of Wales’s letters to departments. The Information Commissioner had said disclosure of the letters was not in the public interest. The Upper Tribunal disagreed. Finally, the Attorney General, agreeing with the Commissioner, exercised his power to override the Tribunal.
Astonishingly, a majority of the Supreme Court (five of seven judges) quashed the Attorney General’s exercise of his power to overrule a decision of the Tribunal – a decision about whether disclosure was in the public interest. As the dissenting judges, Lord Hughes and Lord Wilson, made clear, the two majority judgments in the Supreme Court do not respect the choice Parliament made in enacting the FOIA. And after Evans, any future exercise of the ministerial veto risks legal challenge.
Welcomed by some as a victory for the separation of powers, Professor Christopher Forsyth and I argue, in a Policy Exchange report released today, that this judgement – the Supreme Court’s most important constitutional law decision this year – was dangerously wrong. We contend that it in fact flouts the separation of powers and the rule of law. The Supreme Court undermined Parliament’s democratic choice to entrust senior ministers with the final responsibility to judge what the public interest requires – ministers who are, after all, accountable to Parliament.
The paper explains how the first majority judgment, by Lord Neuberger (joined by Lord Reed and Lord Kerr), misinterprets section 53, imposing an extremely implausible meaning which effectively removes the section from the statute book. The misinterpretation was grounded, we say, on a dubious theory about the entitlement of judges to protect constitutional principle by disregarding Parliament’s clearly expressed will. We also argue that the court is quite simply wrong about the relevant constitutional principles in the case: questions of the public interest are quite properly entrusted to the executive, accountable to Parliament.
The second majority judgment, by Lord Mance (joined by Lady Hale), is less glaringly wrong but is nonetheless also highly problematic. While nominally resisting Lord Neuberger’s misinterpretation, Lord Mance effectively achieves the same outcome by concluding that the Attorney General was not entitled to take a different view to the Tribunal about the existence and significance of constitutional conventions and about possible public reaction to the release of the letters. These were questions, we maintain, that were rightly for the Attorney General himself to decide, for which he was accountable to Parliament, in the way the scheme of the FOIA contemplates and encourages.
The Supreme Court in Evans brings together two very troubling trends in our public law: (a) the judicial temptation (as Lord Wilson put it, in dissent) to rewrite statutes of which the courts disapprove, and (b) the overly intrusive review of statutory powers, which wrongly privileges judicial views about the public interest over executive views, ignoring the constitutional importance of political accountability. (This second trend, of which Evans is but one example, will be explored further in a forthcoming paper for the Judicial Power Project by Jason Varuhas of Cambridge University and UNSW.)
The central significance of Evans is not in its consequences for the monarchy (the Prince of Wales’s correspondence is now subject to an absolute exemption under the FOIA) or even in its implications for the workability of the FOIA and the efficient carrying on of cabinet government (although that is obviously very important). Rather, the case demonstrates the willingness of some – but certainly not all – senior judges to undermine clear statute and to overturn lawful executive action. It is not much comfort that the judges in question, no doubt sincerely, think and say that they are acting to secure the constitution. As Lord Hughes says in dissent, the rule of law is not the rule of courts whatever the statute may say. In our constitution, Acts of Parliament are changed only by Parliament itself, not by judicial fiat, whether in the form of misinterpretation or intrusive judicial review.
Any future exercise of the ministerial veto is vulnerable to legal challenge. And this means that the authoritative choice Parliament made some 15 years ago – a choice to enact freedom of information legislation that includes a ministerial veto – has been undone by judicial action. Our constitution forbids just such judicial action. Whatever one thinks about the merits of the FOIA, it follows that there are very good reasons for Parliament now to act to reverse Evans. The point would not be to protect the Prince of Wales’s correspondence – that horse has bolted. Instead, Parliament now should act to restore and to defend the choice it made in enacting the FOIA in the first place. Our paper proposes a draft bill which would meet this end.
The courts have a vital constitutional role to play in maintaining the rule of law. But they subvert the rule of law and parliamentary democracy when they fail to obey the will of Parliament expressed in statute and when they override the executive’s exercise of its statutory powers. The judicial action in Evans is remarkable and unconstitutional. If the rule of law is not in future to be reduced to the rule of courts then Parliament should act now to answer the Supreme Court and to affirm its authority.
The Supreme Court Verdict
QUOTE
Stephen Sedley
When the government decided to appeal
to the Supreme Court against the High Court’s ruling that ministers could
not lawfully use the royal prerogative to leave the EU without express
legislative authority, many lawyers, myself included, thought it a hopeless
enterprise. A court of three judges – the [ Lord to you - Marxist oaf
] Chief Justice, the Master of the
Rolls and Lord Justice Sales (who had been standing counsel to the
government when at the bar) – had held on cogently reasoned grounds that the
prior authority of an Act of Parliament was required. Nevertheless the
Supreme Court sat in full, all 11 members, to hear what even the sober
Constitution Unit was calling the case of the century. I began preparing
this piece when the judgment was pending, pretty sure that the appeal would
fail and pondering whether it would be correct to describe the outcome as
something of a no-brainer. Well, the appeal did fail, and by a decisive
margin of eight votes to three. But the margin conceals what was
jurisprudentially a closer-run thing than the numbers suggest.
For well over four hundred years British monarchs and their ministers have contested the claims of Parliament to have the last word on matters of state. The judges have arbitrated between them, laying down as part of the common law what ministers can lawfully do in the exercise of the royal prerogative – declare war, make peace, sign treaties, grant honours, govern colonies – and what requires the authority either of the common law or of Parliament. Over these centuries it has been the rolling back of ministerial claims to arbitrary power, exercised by the use of the royal prerogative, that has shaped the British constitution.
In 1636 a London trader called Richard Chambers sued the mayor for having wrongfully imprisoned him for refusing to pay ship money. His case was that the tax was itself unlawful, having been levied by the Crown without the authority of Parliament. The court refused to hear the argument. ‘There is a rule of law,’ Justice Berkeley said, ‘and a rule of government, and things that may not be done by the rule of law may be done by the rule of government.’ It took the rest of the 17th century – a civil war, the king’s execution, the implosion of the republic, the restoration of the monarchy and the parliamentary coup d’état we know as the Glorious Revolution – to establish that government enjoyed no such extra-legal power.
In 1685 the Duke of York, who had been brought up in exile as a Roman Catholic, succeeded his brother Charles II as king and became ex officio head of the Church of England. On any view this was going to be a problem, and James II as he now was, egged on by his theological advisers, made the worst of it. Among other unwise moves he declared the Test Acts, which barred Catholics and dissenters from public office, to be of no effect, allowing him to commission Catholics as army officers at a time when the major threat to the nation was believed to come from the Catholic states of Europe. He then packed the 12-judge court which was going to decide the legality of what he was doing. Its finding in favour of a regal power to suspend or dispense with Parliament’s legislation brought a hurricane of political protest that culminated in James’s abdication and flight. In 1688 Parliament reconstituted itself and offered the crown to William of Orange on terms spelled out in a Bill of Rights that is still the foundational statute of the British state. Its second article reads: ‘That the pretended power of dispensing with laws or the execution of laws by regall authoritie as it hath been assumed and exercised of late is illegall.’ For Scotland, the Claim of Right replicated the prohibition: ‘All Proclamationes asserting ane absolute power to Cass [quash] annul and Dissable lawes … . are Contrair to Law.’
The regal authority or absolute power in question was the royal prerogative: the residue of monarchical powers by which executive government is conducted by ministers and their departments. The powers are residual for more than one reason. When in 1611 Chief Justice Coke held that ‘the King hath no prerogative but what the law of the land allows him,’ he was echoing what his predecessor Sir John Fortescue had written in the 15th century: the king had no power to alter the law (that was for Parliament) or to administer it (that was for the judges). He was also reacting to what the law reporter John Hawarde had noted in 1597: the habit of the queen’s privy counsellors – in effect her ministers – ‘to attribute to their councils and orders the vigour, force and power of a firm law, and of higher virtue and force, jurisdiction and pre-eminence, than any positive law, whether it be the common law or statute law’.
Although the ambit of the prerogative has been constricted over time, it still importantly includes the United Kingdom’s entry into and withdrawal from treaties, a function which accordingly falls to the Crown’s ministers – in substance to the foreign secretary. But because ours is a dualist system, treaties have no effect in domestic law unless and until Parliament decides to adopt them. Thus the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights had no direct effect here until 2000, when the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force. To withdraw from the convention by diplomatic act would have no effect on the legislation giving it domestic effect whereas repeal of the Human Rights Act would leave the convention without any domestic purchase.
All of this boils down to a simple proposition: to use the royal treaty-making prerogative to stultify primary domestic legislation is to do exactly what the Bill of Rights forbids – to dispense with laws by regal authority. It makes no odds whether the law concerned is the Dangerous Dogs Act, which somehow got into the argument before the Supreme Court, or the 1972 European Communities Act with its more recent add-ons: the executive cannot use prerogative power to undo what Parliament has done.
Given all this, it was hardly surprising, despite the foot-stamping of newspapers whose conception of British values seems not to include the country’s constitution, that when the prime minister let it be known that her government intended to trigger the Article 50 leaving mechanism without legislative authority, her proposal was challenged in court. The critical reasoning of the majority in the Supreme Court was this:
withdrawal is fundamentally different from variations in the content of EU law arising from further EU treaties or legislation. A complete withdrawal represents a change which is different not just in degree but in kind from the abrogation of particular rights, duties or rules derived from EU law. It will constitute as significant a constitutional change as that which occurred when EU law was first incorporated in domestic law by the 1972 Act. And, if Notice [under Article 50] is given, this change will occur irrespective of whether Parliament repeals the 1972 Act. It would be inconsistent with long-standing and fundamental principle for such a far-reaching change to the UK constitutional arrangements to be brought about by ministerial decision or ministerial action alone. All the more so when the source in question was brought into existence by Parliament through primary legislation, which gave that source an overriding supremacy in the hierarchy of domestic law sources.
This looks pretty impregnable until you turn to Lord Reed’s dissenting judgment. Standing by the principle of parliamentary supremacy, Reed argues that what Parliament enacted in and after 1972
is inherently conditional … on the UK’s membership of the EU. The Act imposes no requirement, and manifests no intention, in respect of the UK’s membership of the EU. It does not, therefore, affect the Crown’s exercise of prerogative powers in respect of UK membership … If Parliament chooses to give domestic effect to a treaty containing a power of termination, it does not follow that Parliament must have stripped the Crown of its authority to exercise that power … Withdrawal under Article 50 alters the application of the 1972 Act, but is not inconsistent with it. The application of the 1972 Act after a withdrawal agreement has entered into force (or the applicable time limit has expired) is the same as it was before the Treaty of Accession entered into force. As in the 1972 Act as originally enacted, Parliament has created a scheme under which domestic law tracks the obligations of the UK at the international level, whatever they may be … If Parliament grants rights on the basis, express or implied, that they will expire in certain circumstances, then no further legislation is needed if those circumstances occur. If those circumstances comprise the UK’s withdrawal from a treaty, the rights are not revoked by the Crown’s exercise of prerogative powers: they are revoked by the operation of the Act of Parliament itself
What the disagreement comes down to is that the majority see diplomatic withdrawal from the EU as an illicit act of the Crown draining the statutes governing EU membership from 1972 onwards of meaning and effect, while Reed (and his two supporters) sees it as one of an indefinite range of contingencies that the legislation is explicitly designed to accommodate. Using a metaphor that recurs in the judgments, the minority see the legislation as a conduit which may, and does, change repeatedly in what it carries and which may run dry for political reasons which are not the courts’ business. The majority see it as the means prescribed by Parliament by which EU law is introduced into domestic law: ‘So long as the 1972 Act remains in force, its effect is to constitute EU law an independent and overriding source of domestic law.’
From these two approaches flow either of two consequences. One, supported by the majority, is that the executive is constitutionally forbidden to stifle a statutory source of law which will continue to flow until Parliament decides otherwise. The other is that the Crown’s ministers, in conducting the UK’s foreign affairs, are free to turn off the EU tap, leaving Parliament’s legislation empty but intact.
Lord Carnwath, one of the other dissentients, based much of his agreement with Lord Reed on ministerial responsibility to Parliament as a sufficient check on executive action. Leaving aside the fact that ministers are frequently not MPs but peers and do not actually have to be members of either house (the trade union leader Frank Cousins was a rare instance), he may have forgotten what Lord Justice Farwell said in Dyson’s Case more than a century ago: ‘If ministerial responsibility were more than the mere shadow of a name, the matter would be less important, but as it is, the courts are the only defence of the liberty of the subject against departmental aggression.’
Despite Lord Reed’s astute reasoning my vote would go with the majority on the ground I began with. Since 1689 the Crown has been stripped of the power of ‘dispensing with laws or the execution of laws’. Whether diplomatic withdrawal from the EU treaties is regarded as turning off the tap or dismantling the plumbing, its purpose and effect would be to dispense with extant legislation which makes EU law part of the UK’s legal system. That is something which on principle only Parliament has authority to do.
One of the majority taking this view was Lord Sumption, whose critique of the judiciary for meddling in politics drew a good deal of attention when he was appointed directly from the bar to the Supreme Court. So Lord Reed can be forgiven his parting shot: ‘It is important for courts to understand that the legalisation of political issues is not always constitutionally appropriate, and may be fraught with risk, not least for the judiciary.’ But this case was not about the legalisation of political issues: it was about the politicisation of legal issues.
Ironically, if the government’s appeal had succeeded, another troublesome issue might have arisen: whose advice is the monarch required to take in deciding how her prerogative should be exercised? In the ordinary way, one of two things happens: either legislation spells out that it is to be one of her secretaries of state, or the cabinet, basing itself on the theory that the queen is to be advised solely by her ministers, deputes the decision to an appropriate department or takes the decision itself. But constitutionally the monarch’s proper source of advice is still the privy council, which at present consists of about 670 individuals who have held high office in the state as cabinet ministers, judges, diplomats, archbishops or whatever. We shall never know whether, had Gina Miller’s case failed, the law would have required the summoning of a body that nowadays confers in plenary session only to name the successor to the throne or (according to some) to sanction the marriage of a reigning monarch, in order to tender its collective advice as to whether the UK should leave the EU. That really would have upset the Daily Mail.
What now? The probable option is to get Parliament to pass primary
legislation that delegates to ministers the power the law has so far
denied them to give notice of withdrawal from the EU under Article 50.
The practice of using legislation to hand ministers and their
departments colossal tranches of legislative power by the use of what
are known as Henry VIII clauses has been adopted with growing frequency
over the last hundred years or so. The difficulty with doing it in the
present situation is that it will bring down an edifice on which
hundreds of other things depend, many of which are beyond the UK’s
control. There may be no alternative to a detailed Great Repeal Bill and
a prolonged parliamentary odyssey. And if, after two years of
negotiation, no satisfactory deal has been reached with the other member
states, either the UK’s membership of the EU will lapse unconditionally
or our notice under Article 50 will have to be extended or withdrawn.
Who will decide whether this can be done? The Court of Justice of the
European Union, that’s who.
UNQUOTE
Sedley is hostile but then he is not an
Englishman; he is a Marxist Jew [ see e.g.
Judges tell David Cameron to take MORE Syrian refugees ], another of
the sort that want Ethnic Fouling
followed by Genocide & the destruction of
Western Civilization - see
Beneath the mask of the Human Rights industry Prominent British Jews Advocate Increases in Refugees. But none of this applies to Zionist crazies who
run Stolen Land that they call
Israel. They use Ethnic
Cleansing to get rid of the rightful owners.
Attack On Brexit And Democracy Set Up By Aliens
[ 25 January 2017 ]
Brexit was real
Democracy, the voice of the people as distinct from
Representative Democracy, a very
different kettle of fish. As Gilad Atzmon
told us
Jews Can Buy All Western Politicians For Less Than One Main Battle Tank.
I suspect that our politicians aren't that cheap but, yes they are bent.
The legal attack was fronted by Gina Miller, a Sikh from Guyana & Deir Dos Santos, a barber from Brazil. Lurking behind the scenes is the Jew Alan Miller, husband Mk III of Gina M - see Jew Used Third World Alien To Front Attack On Brexit And Democracy. This may well be why Jews like Mishcon de Reya & David Pannick are being used in court.
The Supreme Court split 8 to 3 on this one; thereby displaying their contempt for democracy and proving law is not involved, just their prejudices. NB The head wallah, Neuberger, is a Jew of authoritarian bent who misapplies the law when he thinks he will. Hale & Kerr are just as bad. Lords Carnwath Reed and Hughes got it right
Former Supreme Court Judge Says 52 Percent Can Not Have Brexit
[
28 September 2019
]
QUOTE
Former Supreme Court Judge Lord Sumption told the BBC this morning that
“52% of the electorate simply cannot have 100% of the spoils, they have to
engage with the rest”. Rather letting
the cat out of the bag.
The referendum was a binary choice, Leave or Remain. If the vote had been
to Remain, Britain would not have semi-Brexited, it would have 100% remained
in the EU. The British political system is adversarial, very adversarial
currently, it usually results in clear outcomes. When a candidate wins a
single vote more than their opponents they do get in fact 100% of the
spoils. When Tony Blair won just 35% of the vote and 55% of the seats in
parliament he still dominated British politics and remade centuries of
constitutional order. Creating the Supreme
Court for example…
UNQUOTE
Is
Sumption a fool or a liar? He cannot possibly be stupid enough to
believe this allegation but hopes we are. He shows rather adequately that the Supreme Court is
a bunch of chancers with an agenda. NB He was talking to the
BBC, a bunch of Marxist
Paedophiles and traitors.
Supreme Court Boss Is Bent
[ 17 October 2019 ]
QUOTE
As Guido
reported, last week the head of the Supreme Court, Baroness Hale – who a
fortnight ago ruled that Boris’s prorogation was unlawful – took a
deliberate dig at the PM during a speech. This poorly-disguised
political move perhaps shouldn’t have come as a surprise to followers of
Hale’s past interventions since she has always found it difficult to adhere
to neutrality of the judiciary. She is the
supreme courter of controversy…
The prorogation case brought forward by Gina Miller wasn’t Hale’s first Brexit intervention, she caused outrage in 2016 after a speech in which she addressed whether the Government had the executive power to trigger Article 50:
“Another question is whether it would be enough for a simple act of parliament to authorise the government to give notice, or whether it would have to be a comprehensive replacement of the 1972 act [the European Communities Act].”
In response to the speech, leading Brexiteers such as Iain Duncan Smith said Hale shouldn’t be telling “parliament how they should go about that business” and Melanie Phillips accused the top judge – not then head of the Supreme Court – of having “thrown a judicial hand grenade” into the Brexit issue.
Hale’s political interventions haven’t been limited to Brexit, however. Perhaps her most controversial moment came when she went out of her way to attack legislation still making its way through parliament, saying the ‘Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill’ was “threatening”; a move that even the Law Society Gazette described as “constitutionally unusual”.
The President of the Supreme Court has also actively lobbied for certain
policies, including explicitly
declaring
that Ireland repealing their 8th Amendment was a “reason to
be cheerful” (rather than the more conventional non-political statement
you would expect from such a senior judge). In a similar vein, Hale also
publically lobbied for changes to divorce laws last year – whilst still
president. Hale is of course entitled to
her views, but it is worrying that a senior sitting judge feels able to so
openly advocate her view on such a controversial issue in public…
UNQUOTE
Mrs Hale does not even bother to pretend she is applying the law as it is.
Real power is the power to abuse power. She is like that crooked little
Jew,
Berkowitz abusing his
position as the
Speaker of the House of Commons.
Supreme Court Perverted The Law To Screw Brexit
[ 29 December 2019 ]
QUOTE
Former Tory leader Michael Howard has claimed judges sometimes 'distort' the
law they are interpreting to 'reach they result they want to achieve'. Lord
Howard of Lympne, a former barrister, criticised the Supreme Court for
ruling that
Boris Johnson's prorogation of Parliament in September was 'unlawful'.
He claimed that judges have 'increasingly
substituted their own view of what is right for the view of Parliament and
of ministers'.
UNQUOTE
The
Mail alleges that Howard claimed. Who are we calling crooked, Howard or
the Supreme Court? I agree with
Howard on this
even though he is a Jew. It was easy for the Court to cheat because
there was no law; they made it up as they went; it is what they did at the
Nuremberg War Trials. The
Mail's readers are on side apart from a few sounding off contra.
Boris Getting A Grip Of The Supreme Court After It Invented Bad Law To Screw
Brexit
[ 17 January 2020 ]
QUOTE
Boris Johnson
has ordered a clampdown on the judicial review system. The Prime Minister, who was infuriated last
year when the Supreme Court ruled his suspension of Parliament was illegal,
claimed the system was being ‘abused’. No 10 said a planned legal assessment would be
fast-tracked, with a change in the law likely ‘within months’.
Judicial reviews [ of administrative action ] allow people to challenge government actions in the courts.
But a source claimed some groups were launching repeated legal actions against the same policy and others were using the courts to pursue political ends.
In the Commons, Mr Johnson said: ‘We will continue to ensure that judicial review is available to protect the rights of individuals against an overbearing state, while ensuring that it is not abused to conduct politics by another means or to create needless delays.’
Official statistics show that 3,600 judicial review applications were made in 2018 – equivalent to almost ten a day. The move reflects fears that the courts could be used to frustrate the PM’s plans to deliver radical change.
But it will inevitably be seen as revenge for
last year’s Supreme Court ruling on Mr Johnson’s decision to prorogue
parliament last September, which led to incendiary claims he had misled the
Queen.
UNQUOTE
The arrogant old fool who is the head of the Supreme Court might wish that she had stuck to
knitting instead of meddling with grown up matters.
Supreme Court Excludes Enemy Third World Alien
[ 26 February 2021 ]
QUOTE
Shamima Begum today broke cover after the Supreme Court ruled she cannot
return to the UK to pursue an appeal against the removal of her British
citizenship. The jihadi bride was seen crying and looking angry in her tent
before she marched through al-Roj refugee camp in Syria.
The 21-year-old was wearing Western clothes - a pair of sunglasses, a dark jacket, leggings and white trainers - but refused to comment on the news she will have to fight her case from abroad................ Her British citizenship was revoked on national security grounds shortly after she was found, nine months pregnant, in a Syrian refugee camp in February 2019.............
He also slammed the Court of Appeal's decision to allow her to return, saying there were four principal errors in its judgment.
Lord Reed said it wrongly 'made its own assessment of the requirements of
national security and preferred it to that of the Secretary of State,
despite the absence of any relevant evidence before it'.
UNQUOTE
The Supreme Court got it right for once.
Lord Reed, its
President said that the
Court of Appeal got it badly wrong but he did not say it was pandering
to Begum because she is an enemy alien or that she is an
Enemy Within. No doubt she was perverted by
her family, deeply sincere British Citizens when they are in the dole queue
but Traitors otherwise.
Supreme Court Gets Something Right [
16 December 2021 ]
QUOTE
The UK Supreme Court has rejected a legal challenge brought against the
government over its failure to provide gender neutral passports after an
LGBTQ rights campaigner claimed the lack of an 'X' option breaches human
rights laws.
Christie Elan-Cane, who identifies as a “non-gendered” individual “fighting for legal recognition,” initially launched the legal challenge to secure legal recognition for British people who don’t identify as male or female.
The legal bid was rejected by the Court of Appeal in March 2020, which said the current policy does not breach human rights. The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed Elan-Cane’s appeal on Wednesday, handing the Home Office another win................
Vowing that the Supreme Court’s decision is “not the end,” Elan-Cane will now seek to secure a positive ruling from the European Court of Human Rights, which would overturn the decision from the British courts.
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, India, Malta, Nepal, the
Netherlands, New Zealand and Pakistan all issue gender neutral
passports. Germany also offers an additional intersex category.
UNQUOTE
The current crop of
Lunatic Fringe
twerps choose to pretend they have a different sex or none. They are not
far different from thugs like
Oliver Cromwell, the well
known, self-righteous mass murderer & fanatic. Their sort would also kill if he, she,
they or it could get away with it. Western
Civilization has improved slightly in some areas.